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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffTRespondent,

PEARL TOPANOTES,
Defendant/Petitioner.

CaseNo.20010127-SC
Priority No. 13

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND OPINION BELOW
This Court granted Petitioner Pearl Topanotes1 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311,14 P.3d 695. The Court's
Order granting the Petition is attached hereto as Addendum A, and the court of appeals'
decision in Topanotes is attached as Addendum B. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
A. Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to resolve on the existing record an
issue raised by the state for thefirsttime on appeal.
B. Whether the court of appeals' order of remand for further proceedings and a
"factual determination" on an issue raised by the state for the first time on appeal was
fundamentally unfair and in conflict with Utah case law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of
review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Lewa. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah
1997) (cite omitted). The court of appeals reviewed the issues on appeal in this case as
follows: m[T]he determination of whether an encounter with law enforcement officers
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment... is a legal conclusion that we review
for correctness.'" State v. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^j4 (citing Salt Lake Citv v. Rav.
2000 UT App 55, % 998 P.2d 274).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENTS
Arguments Preserved in the Trial Court In the trial court, Topanotes challenged a
governmental search as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court
upheld the search and Topanotes appealed the matter to the court of appeals. Topanotes1
objections to the search are contained in the record on review ("R.") at 29-38 and 88; see
also R. 98:3-9.
Arguments Preserved in the Court of Appeals. In the court of appeals, the state
conceded that the search conducted in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, Topanotes,
2000 UT App 311, T(8 n.3, then argued for the first time on appeal that evidence discovered
during the unlawful, warrantless search was admissible against Topanotes under the
"inevitable-discovery" doctrine. IdL at ^[10. Topanotes objected to the state's newly raised
argument on the basis that the record failed to support application ofthe inevitable-discovery
doctrine and the doctrine was not a proper alternative ground for affirmance.
2

(See Topanotes1 Reply Brief of Appellant, dated July 14,2000.)
Thereafter, the court of appeals issued its ruling in the matter. It held that the
warrantless search was unlawful. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^[8. It also determined that
it had insufficient information to address the issue of inevitable discovery in this case. The
court of appeals then remanded the case to the trial court for "a factual determination on
whether the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may
be appropriate." Id, at ^12.
In connection with the court of appeals' remand order, Topanotes filed a petition for
rehearing, again objecting to the state's argument for application of the inevitable-discovery
doctrine, and to the court of appeals' remand order for further proceedings on the matter.
(See Petition for Rehearing, dated December 7, 2000.) The court of appeals denied that
petition in an order dated December 15,2000. Topanotes has properly preserved the issues
for review in this case.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions will be determinative ofthe questions presented for review:
U.S. Const, amend. IV and XIV, § 1. The text of those provisions is contained in
Addendum C hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below.
On October 13, 1998, the state charged Petitioner Pearl Topanotes ("Topanotes")
with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense in violation
3

of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). (R. 7-8.)
On July 1,1999, Topanotes filed a motion to suppress the substance giving rise to the
charge in this case on the basis that the substance was discovered during an unlawful search.
(R. 29-38.)
On July 15,1999, the trial court held itsfirsthearing on the motion to suppress. At
that hearing, the prosecutor called two witnesses to testify in support of the state's claim that
the substance at issue was admissible in evidence against Topanotes under the Fourth
Amendment. After both state witnesses testified, the prosecutor specifically represented to
the trial court that the state had no further evidence to present in connection with the matter.
(R. 88:29.) Thereafter, the trial court took the motion to suppress under advisement.
On July 28, 1999, the trial court held a second hearing in the matter, wherein the
prosecutor specifically represented that he would submit the issue of admissibility on the
arguments and evidence contained in the record. (R. 98:3.) The trial judge then ruled on
the matter, denying Topanotes1 request for suppression of the evidence. (R. 98:8.)
On July 28, 1999, Topanotes entered into a conditional guilty plea (R. 56-66),
"reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress evidence." (R. 60.) The
trial court entered judgment against Topanotes and sentenced her to an indeterminate prison
term of up to five years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 56-57.) A copy of the judgment is
attached hereto as Addendum D. While incarcerated, Topanotes appealed the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress.
In the court of appeals proceedings, the state admitted that officers engaged in an
4

unlawful seizure when they detained Topanotes during the warrants check that led to the
discovery of the substance giving rise to the charge in this case. The state also argued for the
first time on appeal that the unlawfully seized evidence was nevertheless admissible against
Topanotes under the inevitable-discovery doctrine. (Brief ofAppellee, dated May 15,2000.)
On November 9,2000, the court of appeals issued a published decision in the matter,
ruling that the officers violated Topanotes1 Fourth Amendment rights when they unlawfully
detained her for the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, ^[8. The court then
considered the state's argument concerning application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine
and determined the record was insufficient on the matter. As a result of the insufficient
record, the court remanded the case to the trial court "for a factual determination on whether
the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be
appropriate." Id. at^|12.
On December 7, 2000, Topanotesfileda petition for rehearing, asking the court of
appeals to vacate the remand order for further proceedings, since such a remand was
unprecedented and unfair. (See Petition for Rehearing, dated December 7, 2000.) On
December 15, 2000, the court of appeals denied the petition. On February 13, 2001,
Topanotes requested certiorari review. This Court granted Topanotes1 petition and granted
an extension of time to October 4,2001, for filing the opening Brief of Petitioner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
"On October 7,1998[,] three Salt Lake City police officers detained defendant on a
public street" outside her trailer home, and requested her identification. Topanotes, 2000
5

UT App 311,1(2; (R. 88:9, 21, 27). In response to the request, Topanotes produced an
identification card or driver's license and handed it to Officer Hansen. (R. 88:9-11.)
Thereafter, Officer Hansen handed the card to Officer Mitchell and told him to call it in for
warrants. (R. 88:14,21-22.) Officer Mitchell took the card and left to conduct the check.
(R. 88:10-11.)
Officers Hansen and Mitchell admitted that when they encountered Topanotes they
did not suspect that she was involved in criminal activity. (R. 88:15-16; 88:28); Topanotes.
2000 UT App 311, f8 n.3. Nevertheless, the officers retained possession of Topanotes1
property outside her presence to run the warrants check. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^[2.
When the warrants check was completed, officers discovered an outstanding warrant for
Topanotes1 arrest. The officers arrested Topanotes and searched her in connection therewith.
During the search, officers discovered heroin in Topanotes' pocket. She "was ultimately
charged with possession of a controlled substance." IdL.
In the trial court, Topanotes filed a motion to suppress admissibility of the substance
discovered during the warrantless search on the basis that the search constituted an unlawful
level-two detention. (R. 29-38); see State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987);
Salt Lake Citv v.Smoot 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah Ct. App.), cerL denied. 925 P.2d 963
(Utah 1996) (in order to legally effect a level-two detention or seizure, the officer must have
"articulable suspicion" that the suspect has or is about to commit a crime) (citing State v.
Munsen, 821 P.2d 13.15 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 199 n. cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)).

6

On July 15,1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter, wherein
the prosecutor presented evidence in connection with his argument that the substance
discovered during the warrantless search was admissible under the Fourth Amendment.
(See R. 88; 67-71.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under
advisement.
Thereafter, on July 28, 1999, the trial court held a second hearing. During that
hearing, the prosecutor specifically represented that he would submit the issue of
admissibility on the facts and arguments already contained in the record. (R. 98:3.) The trial
court then entered a ruling on the matter, denying Topanotes' motion to suppress.
According to the trial court, at all times relevant, the officers were engaged in a consensual
level-one encounter with Topanotes; the officers discovered the outstanding warrant and
controlled substance at issue during that consensual encounter. (R. 98:3-9.)
Prior to the trial court's ruling, the state could not have known whether the court
would suppress the evidence or find it admissible. In connection with its argument
concerning admissibility, the state was given at least two opportunities to present the
evidence it deemed relevant on the matter. (See R. 88; 98:3.) Also, the prosecutor twice
represented to the trial court that he was satisfied with the evidence and arguments submitted
by the state on the issue of admissibility. (See R. 88:29; 98:3.)
When Topanotes appealed the trial court's ruling to the court of appeals, the state
conceded the trial court erred in its ruling.

Specifically, the state admitted that when

officers asked for and then retained possession of Topanotes' identification card to check
7

for outstanding warrants, the matter escalated to a non-consensual, unlawful level-two
detention. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^[8 n.3.
While the analysis should have ended with the state's concession, the state's argument
in the matter continued as follows.
According to the state, the controlled substance was admissible against Topanotes
under an alternative theory raised for the first time on appeal: application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine. The state argued that if the court of appeals found the record in this case
to be insufficient to support its new theory, "the proper remedy is remand to allow the trial
court to make the fact sensitive determination in thefirstinstance." (See Brief of Appellee,
dated May 15,2000, at 11 n.3.)
On November 11,2000, the court of appeals issued a published decision, remanding
the case to the trial court "for a factual determination on whether the heroin would have been
inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be appropriate." Topanotes. 2000 UT
App 311,^11-12. The remand order is improper. Additional facts relating to the issues on
review are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, an appellate court will affirm a trial court's ruling on an alternative
theory raised for the first time on appeal if the theory is apparent on the record. State v.
Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Association. 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969)); State v. Chevre. 2000 UT App 6, 994
P.2d 1278. That means, the existing record must support the alternative theory, otherwise,
8

the appellate court will not consider the matter on appeal. The Utah rule ensures
fundamental fairness and due process in the proceedings below and on appeal.
In Topanotes1 case, the state argued for thefirsttime on appeal that the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress should be affirmed under the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
Inasmuch as the state had raised a new theory for affirmance on appeal, the court of appeals
was required to assess whether that theory could be sustained on the existing record, or
whether it must be rejected. The court of appeals refused to engage in that analysis of the
matter. Rather, it remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. That was
improper. Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court make the proper assessment for
the new theory on the existing record, or remand the case to the court of appeals for that
assessment. To that end, this Court or the court of appeals should find that the existing
record is insufficient to support the state's argument for application of the inevitablediscovery doctrine.
Next, in the event this case is remanded to the trial court, the remand order must be
limited to proceedings on the existing record. The state may not be entitled to another
evidentiary hearing on remand in order to present additional evidence in the matter.
Under state and federal law, the state bears the burden of establishing the admissibility
of evidence under the Fourth Amendment. To that end, the state's factual predicate for admissibility must be fully developed before appeal. If the state fails to present evidence in the
original proceedings relevant to the matter, the state is not entitled to a second — or in this
case, third — opportunity to elicit facts supporting yet a new argument to justify the officers'
9

warrantless conduct. See State v. Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995) (the state
bears the burden of proof and is not entitled to a remand to put on new evidence after
appeal); State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Remand for another
evidentiary hearing would be fundamentally and procedurally unfair and unprecedented.
Thus, Topanotes respectfully requests that any remand of this matter to the trial court be
limited to proceedings on the existing record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. SINCE THE STATE RAISED THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY
DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AS AN ALTERNATIVE
GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS
REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THAT ISSUE ON THE EXISTING RECORD.
A. THE DOCTRINE OF AFFIRMING ON AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL APPLIES ONLY IF DUE
PROCESS IS SATISFIED.
In Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Association. 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969), this
Court articulated the rule for affirming a judgment on an alternative ground raised for the
first time on appeal:
The law is well settled that a trial court should be affirmed if on the record made it
can be. The general law is stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error §1464(1) as follows: "*
* * The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree appealedfromif it
is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differsfromthat stated by the trial court to be the basis for its ruling
or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued
on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or
passed on by the lower court. * * *."
Limb. 461 P.2d at 293, n. 2; see also Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254,1259-60 (Utah 1998)
(separate theories for affirmance were "supported by the evidence," and therefore "apparent
10

on the record," for purposes of the doctrine of affirming on alternative grounds). That
doctrine comports with due process, as demonstrated in State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145
(Utah Ct.App. 1997).
In Montova, the defendant moved to suppress evidence discovered by police during
an inventory search of his car. After the trial court upheld the search under the Fourth
Amendment, defendant appealed, claiming the search was invalid. Id at 148. "The State
responded on appeal] by conceding that it failed to establish that the inventory search was
valid, primarily because it wholly failed to demonstrate that the police department had
standardized inventory procedures and what those procedures were." Id.

Thereafter,

notwithstanding the concession, the state asked the court of appeals to uphold the search on
alternative grounds. The state asked the court to find that the search was "incident to a lawful
arrest" and supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id at 148-49.
In considering the matter, the court of appeals recognized it may affirm the lower
court's ruling on "any proper ground as long as there is evidence in the record supporting
such an affirmance." Id. at 149. The court of appeals also stated the following:
Critical to affirmance is the requirement [that] the ground or theory be "apparent on
the record." Id. If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first time on appeal
is not apparent on the record, the principle of affirming on any proper ground has no
application. To hold otherwise would invite the prevailing party to selectively focus
on issues below, the effect of which is holding back issues that the opposition had
neither notice of nor an opportunity to address. Because of this due process
component, "apparent on the record," in this context, means more than mere
assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the "new" ground or theory. The
record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or
theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party
may rely thereon on appeal.
11

Montova. 937 P.2d at 149-50. The court also specified that the alternative ground must be
"well-briefed" on appeal to be considered. Id. at 150.
In Montoya. the court of appeals refused to consider new arguments raised first on
appeal since the facts necessary to establish the new bases for affirmance were not apparent
from the record and the arguments were not adequately briefed. Id. The state's arguments
were rejected and the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress was reversed. IdL
In Topanotes* case, the court of appeals disregarded the law articulated above.
Specifically, Topanotes argued in the court of appeals that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to suppress, where officers engaged in an unlawful "level-two stop
without the requisite articulable suspicion." Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^[4. During the
unlawful level-two detention, officers discovered a warrant for Topanotes1 arrest and they
searched her in connection with executing that warrant. During the search, officers
discovered the controlled substance that resulted in the charge in this case.
On appeal, the state conceded the officers1 conduct was unconstitutional. Topanotes.
2000 UT App 311, <|[8 n.3. Nevertheless, the state asked the court of appeals to rule that the
controlled substance discovered during the unlawful detention was admissible against
Topanotes on the basis that officers inevitably would have discovered that substance if they
had engaged in a lawful search. (See Brief of Appellee, dated May 15, 2000.) The state
argued for the first time on appeal that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied to this case.
The state's argument constituted a newly raised, alternative ground for affirmance.
In considering the state's new argument, the court of appeals should have assessed
12

whether the alternative ground was "apparent on the record" and whether the record placed
a person of ordinary intelligence on notice in the trial court that the state may rely on that
alternative ground for affirmance on appeal. Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149-50. Instead, the
court of appeals stated the following:
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the exclusionary rule, see State v.
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288,1293 (Utah Ct. App.1988), and "[t]he appropriate standard
governing the inevitable discovery exception is whether 'the prosecution can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have been
discovered by lawful means/" State v. James, 2000 UT 80, % 16,405 Utah Adv. Rep.
31 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377
(1984)). More precisely, the State "fmust show that the evidence 'would have been
discovered, not simply that it "could" or "might" have been discovered.1" M V. v.
State, 1999 UT App 104,112, 977 P.2d 494 (quoting Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 923 n.
8) (alterations in original).
K 11 Because the trial court ruled that the initial detention was legal, the issue
of inevitable discovery was not addressed below. "This court has consistently
recognized that [issues of search and seizure] are highly fact sensitive," State v.
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,770 (Utah Ct. App.1990), and "[i]t is not the function of an
appellate court to make findings of fact because it does not have the advantage of
seeing or hearing the witnesses testify." Ruckerv.Dalton, 598P.2d 1336,1338 (Utah
1979). Moreover, "complete, accurate[,] and consistent findings of fact ... [are]
essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law." Id
T| 12 Therefore, we remand for a factual determination on whether the heroin
would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be
appropriate.
Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311,111110-12: see also State v. Howard. 509N.W.2d 764,767-68
(Iowa 1993) (although the trial court denied the motion to suppress on the basis that the
warrant was valid, the appellate court affirmed the search on an alternative ground apparent
in the record: the existing evidence supported consent to search).
The court of appeals1 remand for a factual determination and further proceedings is
inappropriate. Such a remand is fundamentally unfair and serves to provide the state with
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an unprecedented second, or in this case third, "bite at the apple." See infra subpoint I.C.,
and Points II. Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the court of appeals1
remand order as it relates to the inevitable-discovery doctrine, and either decide that issue
here or remand the matter to the court of appeals for a resolution of the issue on the existing
record.
B. THE RECORD IN THIS CASE CONTAINS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE STATES ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN
ALTERNATIVE GROUND RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
1. "Inevitable Discovery" Is a Fact-Intensive Issue.
The Exclusionary Rule. Pursuant to Fourth Amendment law, when officers engage
in an illegal search or seizure, evidence obtained in connection therewith will be suppressed
under the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a remedy for a constitutional violation.
See Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (rule applies to States via the Fourteenth
Amendment). It compels respect for the Fourth Amendment, it deters policefrominvading
homes and interfering with an individual's personal sanctity in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and it removes an officer's incentive to disregard the constitutional guaranty.
The Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine. The "inevitable-discovery" doctrine is a limited
exception to the exclusionary rule. It considers, among other things, whether the illegally
seized evidence "ultimately" would have been discovered through lawful means. Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984); State v. James, 2000 UT 80,1J16, 13 P.3d 576. The
inevitable-discovery doctrine is not an "exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant
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requirement.1 It is a fact-intensive doctrine that applies in limited circumstances to block
application of the exclusionary rule.
The United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized the inevitable-discovery
doctrine in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431. There, officers believed defendant had concealed
a young girl's body near a road, ditch, culvert or abandoned building between two points on
the map. See id at 435. An officer in charge of searching the area began the process of
marking off maps between the two points in a grid fashion, separating 200 volunteers into
teams, and assigning them to search specific grid areas. Id. at 435, 448-49. Volunteers
were instructed to concentrate their efforts on roadsides, culverts, ditches, and abandoned
buildings. Id.
After volunteers began searching, defendant disclosed the location ofthe body during
an unlawful interrogation. Id.at 435-36. The body was located near a roadside ditch in an
area to be searched under the grid system. Id. at 436, 449. The Nix Court ruled that
discovery of the body was inevitable as supported by the officers1 testimony concerning the
lawful, independent investigation relating to the search for the body. Id_at 449-50.
The Nix Court applied the inevitable-discovery doctrine where the prosecutor
presented specific facts in the trial court to support that a lawful investigation inevitably
would have led to the discovery.

Exceptions to the warrant requirement include consent, plain view, incident to arrest,
and "probable cause to search plus exigent circumstances." See State v. Lambert. 710 P.2d
693, 698 (Kan. 1985).
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In Topanotes1 case, the state failed in the trial court to present evidence of a lawful
investigation that ultimately would have led to the discovery of the controlled substance
obtained during the warrantless search. Thus, the inevitable-discovery doctrine cannot apply
as an alternative basis for affirmance on appeal.
2. The Facts in Topanotes* Case Do Not Support Application of the InevitableDiscovery Doctrine.
In Nix, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that the inevitable-discovery
doctrine is not based in speculation. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, n.5. Rather, its application relies
on "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment." Id 2 That
is, in the context of this case, the prosecutor was required to present basic, primary evidence
of the lawful investigation that would have led ultimately to the discovery of the controlled
substance obtained during the warrantless search.
By way of explanation, the factual determinations in Nix were capable of verification
or impeachment. There, the prosecutor presented evidence in the trial court that ~ absent
the unlawful conduct - officers ultimately would have discovered the young girl's body in
connection with a lawful investigation. The evidence of the lawful investigation consisted
of the following:
[T]he prosecution offered the testimony of Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of
Criminal Investigation. Ruxlow had organized and directed some 200 volunteers
who were searching for the child's body. Tr. of Hearings on Motion to Suppress in
2

"Historical facts" are facts that are admitted and established in evidence. See Ornelas
v. U.S.. 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). They include a recital of the events and credibility
determinations. The historical facts serve as a basis for the trial court's factual findings. See
Thompson v.Keohane. 516 U.S. 99,109-10 (1995).
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State v. Williams, No. CR 55805, p. 34 (May 31, 1977). The searchers were
instructed "to check all the roads, the ditches, any culverts .... If they came upon any
abandoned farm buildings, they were instructed to go onto the property and search
those abandoned farm buildings or any other places where a small child could be
secreted." Id., at 35. Ruxlow testified that he marked off highway maps of
Poweshiek and Jasper Counties in grid fashion, divided the volunteers into teams of
four to six persons, and assigned each team to search specific grid areas. Id., at 34.
Ruxlow also testified that, if the search had not been suspended because of
[defendant's] promised cooperation, it would have continued into Polk County, using
the same grid system. Id., at 36,39-40. Although he had previously marked off into
grids only the highway maps of Poweshiek and Jasper Counties, Ruxlow had
obtained a map of Polk County, which he said he would have marked off in the same
manner had it been necessary for the search to continue. Id., at 39.
*

*

*

There was testimony that it would have taken an additional three to five hours to
discover the body if the search had continued; the body was found near a culvert, one
of the kinds of places the teams had been specifically directed to search.
Mx, 467 U.S. at 448-449.
Likewise, in U.S. v. Larsen. 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 522
U.S. 1140 (1998), the court looked to the primary facts of record in the trial court to
determine application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. In that case, officers obtained
a warrant allowing them to search for and seize certain vehicles and vehicle titles on
defendant's property. While the officers were executing the warrant, they seized numerous
unauthorized items, including "bank records." Id.at 985.
After the items were seized, a state trooper involved in executing the warrant, stopped
at the local bank for personal reasons. He mentioned to the bank vice president that he had
recovered vehiclesfromdefendant's property. The bank vice president "became concerned
because the bank had loaned money to [defendant] for a vehicle." Id. After the officer left
the bank, the vice president independently pulled his records relating to defendant and sent
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a Report of Apparent Crime to the FDIC. The FDIC forwarded the Report to Agent
Crabtree of the FBI. Id
Meanwhile the state trooper, who had executed the search warrant, independently
contacted a KBI agent and forwarded the unlawfully seized records to him. The KBI agent
in turn contacted Crabtree. Id.
Crabtree investigated the matter, "issued subpoenas and, in accordance with standard
FBI procedures, began tracing [defendant's] banking activities. This led to issuance of
subpoenas by a grand jury and discovery of the bank records on which [defendant's]
prosecution for federal bank fraud and money laundering was based." Id_at 985.
With the charges against him, defendant moved to suppress all evidence in the matter
on the basis that officers exceeded the scope of the warrant during the initial search when
they unlawfully seized his bank records. IdL Defendant argued that the unlawful seizure
poisoned all evidence discovered thereafter. The district court agreed and determined the
excessive warrants search was unlawful. However, that court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied and
would block application ofthe exclusionary rule. According to the facts, Crabtree ultimately
would have discovered the fraudulent transactions when he reviewed the Report that the
bank vice president sent to him. Id. at 986. Since Crabtree ultimately would have
discovered the fraud through lawful means, the records seized during the excessive search
were admissible against Larsen under the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
Pursuant to Nix and Larsen, the inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable to
18

Topanotes' case as a matter of law and a matter of record. The state failed in the trial court
to present evidence to support application of that doctrine in this case.
Specifically, the evidence in this case supported a single investigation. Officer
Hansen encountered Topanotes outside her trailer home and requested an identification card.
Topanotes produced a card and gave it to Hansen. Thereafter, Hansen handed the card to
Officer Mitchell, who walked away with the card to run the warrants check, while Topanotes
remained detained. The officers acknowledged that during the encounter, they did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Topanotes was involved in criminal conduct. (R.
88:16,28.) Nevertheless, the officers continued to retain possession of Topanotes1 property
and to detain her in connection with the warrants check until her arrest.
The officers in this case also testified that the investigation they conducted here was
a matter of "common practice" or routine. (R. 88:16; 88:22.) That is, their routine practice
consisted of unlawfully detaining a person and retaining possession of her property without
reasonable suspicion, while conducting a warrants check. (R. 88:16,28 (officers testified
they had no reason to suspect Topanotes of criminal activity; nevertheless, they retained
possession of her property and detained her for a warrants check as a matter of routine).)
The routine or common practice in this case consisted of an unlawful detention.
There is no evidence in this case that officers were engaged in or contemplated any
other investigation (lawful or otherwise) concerning Topanotes, and there is no indication
that officers contemplated or believed they ultimately would have discovered a controlled
substance in Topanotes' possession if they had pursued some lawful course of action. In the
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absence of facts to support the existence of a lawful investigation, the inevitable-discovery
doctrine is inapplicable. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987; see also Nix. 467 U.S. at 444.
C.
THE ANALYSIS SHOULD END HERE. WITHOUT FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT ON THE MATTER.
In this case, application of the inevitable-discovery rule as a unique remedy to the
constitutional violation is not apparentfromthe record. The state did not argue the issue or
present evidence in the trial court concerning the matter. (See record in general.) Topanotes
was not on notice of the possible application of such a unique remedy and she had no
opportunity to cross-examine Officers Hansen or Mitchell in connection with its possible
application. See Montoya. 937 P.2d at 149-50. In this case, the inevitable-discovery
doctrine may not serve as an alternative basis for affirmance. Id
Furthermore, remand for additional proceedings is inappropriate and unnecessary in
this matter for several reasons: First, remand would be unprecedented and fundamentally
unfair. See infra. Point II. The state bears the burden of proof in establishing application
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. Nix. 467 U.S. at 444. In this matter, the state filed
papers relating to its argument that the controlled substance was admissible under Fourth
Amendment law, participated in oral argument, and presented witnesses to testify. (R. 6771; 88; 98.) The state was given a full and fair opportunity to present the evidence it deemed
relevant to its admissibility argument in the matter. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial
court made its ruling on the facts that the state chose to present. Based on the evidence the
state presented in the matter, there is nothing in the record to support that the officers
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ultimately would have discovered the controlled substance through lawful means.
This Court should decide the issues based on the record the state chose to create in
this matter. To that end, as a result of failing to elicit information concerning the inevitablediscovery doctrine, the state failed to develop a factual predicate in the trial court to justify
application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine and it failed in its burden of proof. The
state's failure to meet its burden is a sufficient basis for ruling that the inevitable-discovery
doctrine is inapplicable. See Case. 884 P.2d at 1278 (trial court's order denying motion to
suppress reversed where the state failed to present sufficient evidence to justify its position
under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995)
("[On] the basis of the evidence now on the record, this search should not be upheld"; state
failed to present sufficient evidence); State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 903 (Utah App.
1993) (based on evidence the state elected to submit, case would not be remanded for further
proceedings; the state's evidence was insufficient to uphold confession under Miranda):
Barnett v. U.S., 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (where government failed to meet its
burden, it would not be given second chance on remand).
Second, remand for further proceedings on the inevitable-discovery doctrine is
inappropriate from a policy standpoint since the unlawful officer conduct described in this
case compels application of the exclusionary rule. The officers in this matter testified they
routinely detain individuals on the street -

without reasonable articulable suspicion to

believe such individuals have committed a crime - in order that officers may run a warrants
check on them. That routine practice offends basic principles of the Fourth Amendment.
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The officers in this case may only begin to comprehend the offensive nature of their
unlawful, intrusive conduct against an individual's personal liberties if the exclusionary rule
is applied here. The exclusionary rule would deter these officers from engaging in further
unlawful routine practices, as described herein, and it would remove all incentives for the
officers to make such unlawful seizures common place. Simply, this is a case for application
of the exclusionary rule.
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' REMAND ORDER FOR A
FACTUAL DETERMINATION AND ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS IS
OVERLY BROAD. IN THE EVENT THE CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY
DOCTRINE. THAT REMAND ORDER MUST BE LIMITED TO
PROCEEDINGS ON THE EXISTING RECORD.
A. REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OCCURS UNDER LIMITED
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DO NOT EXIST HERE.
Utah appellate courts have remanded cases for further proceedings and additional
findings in limited circumstances. Specifically, if a trial court has addressed a particular rule
of law in the original proceedings but has entered inadequate findings and the facts of record
are in conflict on the matter, an appellate court may remand the case for additional findings.
See State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1253-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where state raised
inevitable discovery doctrine in trial court, case would be remanded for findings on the
matter), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). In addition, Utah appellate courts have
specified that remand is limited to the entry of findings based on the facts already exiting in
the record. See State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114,1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
In State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114, the trial court considered and misapplied the
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incident-to-arrest exception in the original proceedings. On appeal, the court of appeals
articulated the appropriate legal standard for application of that doctrine, and remanded the
case "for the trial court to apply the law as set forth in this opinion on the evidence
previously presented to the trial court at the hearing on the motion to suppress." Id. at 1121;
see also State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994) (lower court misapplied law as
it related to the "pretext doctrine" requiring remand for findings under correct application
of the law); State v. GenovesL 871 P.2d 547,548-50,552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (defendant
argued on appeal that trial court's findings were inadequate; court of appeals remanded for
findings on the existing record), connected case, Statev.Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916,919 (Utah
Ct App. 1995).
In Topanotes1 case, the court of appeals ruled that it needed complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact to resolve application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311,1J11. In support of that determination, the court relied on
Ruckerv.Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
There, a homeowner sued a builder over a contract dispute. Id. at 1337. The
homeowner claimed that an agreement between the parties held the builder responsible for
the workmanship on several aspects of the construction project. According to the
homeowner, the builder's responsibilities were listed on a "bid" relating to the agreement.
The homeowner also claimed that the builder's work was deficient as it related to those
aspects of the project, and he requested damages against the builder in the amount of
$20,000. The builder counterclaimed for $500, which constituted the balance of the price
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due under the contract. IcL at 1337-38. The case was tried to the court without a jury. Id.
At the conclusion of trial, the judge entered findings of fact on the matter, and
determined that the builder was responsible only for one aspect of the construction project.
The trial judge entered judgment in favor of the homeowner in the amount of $2,000, and
the homeowner appealed. LI at 1337-38. This Court reviewed the matter and found the
trial court's findings to be incomplete with respect to issues raised in the proceedings.
Specifically, there was no indication as to why the trial court found the builder to be
responsible only with respect to one aspect of the project, when eight aspects were listed on
the "bid." The findings also were inconsistent on their face. Id. at 1338-39. On that basis,
this Court remanded the case for proper findings "in accordance with the evidence." Id^
The circumstances in Topanotes' case do not compel remand for further proceedings.
Here, the state raised the inevitable-discovery doctrine for thefirsttime on appeal. The court
of appeals had an undisputed record of the proceedings. It was required under the law to
make its own determinations with respect to application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine,

3

In State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah
1990), the court of appeals granted a petition for interlocutory appeal to consider a ruling on
a motion to suppress. Id, at 881. According to the evidence, the officer initiated a traffic
stop because defendant had malfunctioning equipment. The officer became suspicious that
defendant was transporting drugs when defendant responded to questions in a manner in
conflict with the car rental agreement. The officer requested consent to search the car. When
he came upon four suitcases in the trunk, the defendant claimed they did not belong to him.
Id. at 882. The officer discovered drugs in the suitcases. Id.
On appeal, defendant claimed he did not consent to a search of the suitcases; the state
responded that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. Because the trial court did
not make adequate findings and both parties considered the issues to be "pivotal" to the
appeal, the court of appeals remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at 887.
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where that issue was raised for thefirsttime in the court of appeals. See supra. Point I,
herein. Instead the court of appeals remanded the case for a factual determination and
further proceedings on an issue that was not raised in the lower court. The order of remand
under the circumstances of this case is in conflict with Utah law. See supra. Point I, herein.
Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court vacate that order as it relates to application
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
B. REMAND DOES NOT ENTITLE THE STATE TO ANOTHER EVIDENTIARY
HEARING. THE STATE HAS HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY IN THE TRIAL
COURT TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE IT DEEMED NECES SARY. IT WOULD
VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW AND THE DUE PROCESS
PROVISION TO PERMIT THE STATE TO ENGAGE IN ANOTHER
EVIDENTIARY HEARING AT THIS JUNCTURE.
The court of appeals' order remanding the case to the trial court for "a factual
determination on whether the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such
proceedings as may be appropriate," Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, U12, is overly broad. It
may be construed in this matter and in subsequent cases to provide the state with a fresh
opportunity on remand to present evidence on a new Fourth Amendment issue, where the
state failed in its burden of proof the first time around. Such precedent would violate
fundamental fairness and due process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV (ensuring due process
and fundamental fairness); see also U.S. Const, amend. V (providing that defendant shall
not be placed twice in jeopardy).
In the event this Court upholds the court of appeals1 remand order for further
proceedings on application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, the order must be limited to

25

proceedings where the trial court will make factual determinations on the evidence already
existing in the record.
1. The State Must Present Evidence Prior to the Appeal to Support Admissibility
Under the Fourth Amendment.
As a matter of due process and Fourth Amendment law the state has the burden of
establishing the admissibility of evidence obtained during a warrantless search. See State v.
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (state bears burden of proof in establishing
admissibility under the Fourth Amendment); Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (prosecutor bears burden
of proof in establishing application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine); James. 2000 UT
80,116 (same). Where the state has been provided with a full and fair opportunity to present
the evidence it deems relevant to meet its burden of proof, the state is not entitled to a second
bite at the apple with a retrospective critique of the issue from an appellate court. That is,
the state is bound by the record it created during the evidentiary hearing in the original trial
court proceedings. If a proper factual predicate has not been developed to justify application
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, the state is not entitled to another evidentiary hearing
on the matter. Under Utah case law, it would be improper and fundamentally unfair to
remand a case for further proceedings on a Fourth Amendment issue in order that the state
may present additional evidence consistent with the appellate court's retrospective critique
of the issue. The following cases govern the matter.
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), defendant claimed the officer
who searched his car lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial stop. Id at 1275.
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The trial court disagreed with defendant and denied the motion to suppress. Id. On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the basis that the state failed to present
sufficient evidence to justify the stop. Id. at 1278-80. As that court recognized, the state had
the initial burden to establish "the articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion
necessary to support an investigative stop." Id. at 1276. Where the state failed to present
sufficient evidence, it would not be allowed to cure deficiencies on remand. "The deficiency
in the factual findings was inevitable because the State failed to provide any evidence at all
regarding the origin of, and basis for, the dispatcher's broadcast [leading to the initial stop].
No evidence was presented that could have shed light on the [matter]." Id at 1278.
In State v. Hodson. 866 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (HodsonJ), defendant
appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and asked the court of appeals to
examine whether drug enforcement agents conducted an unreasonable search. The court
remanded the case for additional proceedings. Id, at 564. Thereafter, this Court granted
certiorari review, and specified that since the state had the burden of proof, it would not be
entitled to remand in order to put on new evidence:
Because the burden of showing reasonableness in the amount of force used and the
safety of any form of "neckholds" lies with the State, it is not entitled to a remand to
put on new evidence. And on the basis of the evidence now in the record, this search
should not be upheld. We therefore reverse and order suppression of the evidence
obtained by excessive force.
State v.Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995) (HodsonJI) (cites omitted).
In State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the trial court refused to
suppress statements obtained in violation of the law then in effect under Miranda v. Arizona.
27

384 U.S. 436 (1966). On appeal, the state requested remand for an evidentiary hearing. The
court of appeals agreed with defendant that the authority relied upon by the state did not
support remand when the state bears the initial burden of proof in the matter. Gutierrez, 864
P.2d at 903. The court stated the following:
Having concluded that remanding this case would give the State an
unprecedented opportunity to bolster or modify the prosecution's original argument,
taking advantage of a retrospective critique by the State, we find no legal basis for the
remand requested by the State. Furthermore, remand as requested by the State would
not be sound judicial policy, as it would permit successive attempts to introduce
evidence overlooked in prior hearings, thus preventing final conclusion of these
proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that the State's request for a remand of this case
is both legally and factually untenable.
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 903 (footnote omitted).
2. It Would Be Fundamentally Unfair and a Violation of the Double Jeopardy
Provision and the Fourth Amendment to Provide the State with Another Opportunity
to Present Evidence on Remand.
Case law from other jurisdictions provides support for Topanotes' position.

In

Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197 (D.C. 1987), the court determined the facts did not
support admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment as argued by the
government.

The court denied the government's request to remand the case for an

evidentiary hearing.
We are not persuaded by the government's argument that the case be remanded
for a further hearing on the motion to suppress to determine whether Officer Willis
had probable cause to believe appellant had violated § 40-627. We decline to remand
for a rehearing on the motion for two reasons.
First, according to Officer Willis' testimony, there was no evidence that
appellant had refused to identify himself, as required for a valid arrest under § 40-627.
Secondly, the government failed to meet its burden of proof in its attempt to
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justify appellant's warrantless arrest. We have held that in the case of a claimed
Fourth Amendment violation, absent a warrant, the burden is on the government to
go forward with evidence that will bring the case within one or more exceptions to the
exclusionary rule so as to vindicate the challenged police misconduct. We are not
persuaded that the government should have a second chance to elicit facts supporting
an affirmance of the trial court's ruling as the record indicates that it had afoiland fair
opportunity to present whatever facts it chose to meet its burden of justifying the
warrantless arrest and resulting search and seizure.
IcL at 200 (cites omitted); Ex Parte Hergott 588 So. 2d 911,916 (Ala. 1991) (remand would
violate Double Jeopardy Clause; state does not get second chance).
The principles identified above apply with equal force in considering whether remand
is appropriate for further proceedings relating to application of the inevitable-discovery
doctrine. To the extent such proceedings would include an evidentiary hearing, that would
be fundamentally unfair and unprecedented.
In this case, when the state presented evidence and argument in the trial court
concerning the seized heroin, it had no way to know whether the trial court would uphold
the search or find it unlawful. Nevertheless, the state desired one result in the matter: that
the heroin be admitted into evidence against Topanotes under the Fourth Amendment. To
that end, the state presented the evidence it deemed relevant to the matter. Indeed, the state
was given a foil and fair opportunity to present all evidence it considered necessary to a
determination concerning the admissibility of the heroin. (See.R. 88; 98:3.)
During the trial court proceedings, the state determined not to present evidence
concerning application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253
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(state presented evidence in the initial trial court proceedings relating to both an exception
to the warrant requirement and application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine in the event
search was deemed unlawful).
Now, after an appeal on the issues, the state should not be given a second chance —
or in this case, a third chance (R. 88 (state given opportunity to present evidence it deemed
relevant); 98:3 (state given opportunity to further address the matter with the court)) — to
present evidence on matters it failed to raise in the original trial court proceedings. It would
be fundamentally and procedurally unjust to allow the state to make repeated attempts to
validate the admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment, particularly where
the state now has a specific mission and instructionsfromthe court of appeals as to how to
cure its prior inadequacies in the matter. On that basis, Topanotes respectfully requests that
this Court vacate the court of appeals' remand order for further proceedings relating to the
inevitable-discovery doctrine.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the court of appeals' remand order for further proceedings on the inevitable-discovery
doctrine, a doctrine raised by the state for the first time on appeal. In addition, Topanotes
requests either that this Court rule on the state's newly raised ground for affirmance, or
remand the case to the court of appeals for resolution of that issue on the existing record. To
that end, this Court and/or the court of appeals should find that the inevitable-discovery
doctrine is inapplicable to this case.
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In the event this Court deems it necessary to remand this case to the trial court for any
further proceedings, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court specifically limit the
matter to a remand for proceedings on the existing record.
SUBMITTED this ¥^day of

^t^U.

2001.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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UTAH SUPREME COURT
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S t a t e of Utah,

JUL t 8 2001

Respondent,
No. 20010127-SC
v.
Pearl

990708-CA
981920853
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LERK 0 F THE

Topanotes,
Petitioner,

ORDER

This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
filed on February 13, 2001, by petitioner is granted, and the
Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed on March 28, 2001,
by respondent is granted.

FOR THE COURT:

COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on July 23, 2001, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered to a personal
representative of the following office (s) to be delivered to the
parties listed below:
MARIAN DECKER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
LINDA M. JONES
RALPH DELLAPIANA
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the court (s) listed
below:
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

Pearl TOPANOTES, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 990708-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 9, 2000.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 2000.
Defendant was convicted in the District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Leslie A. Lewis, J., of third degree possession of a controlled substance, and defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Thome, J., held that:
(1) officers' detention of defendant during
time it took them to check for outstanding
warrants was in violation of defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether
police officers' discovery of defendant's outstanding warrants supported application of
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary
rule was a question for the trial court, rather
than the Court of Appeals.
Reversed and remanded.

probable cause to believe an offense has been
committed or is being committed. U.S.C A
ConstAmend. 4.
3. Arrest <s=»63.5<9)
Police officers did not have a reasonable
articulable suspicion that defendant who was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance had committed or. was about to commit a crime, and thus officers detention of
defendant during time it took them to check
for outstanding warrants was in violation of
defendant's Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizures, where reasonable person in defendant's position would not have
felt free to just walk away. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
4. Criminal Law <3=»1134(3), 1181.5(7)
Whether police officers' discovery of defendant's outstanding warrants supported application of inevitable discovery exception to
exclusionary rule was a question for the trial
court, rather than the Court of Appeals, necessitating remand for factual determination
as to whether heroin discovered on defendant's person would have been inevitably discovered.
5. Criminal Law <3=>394.1(3)

L Criminal Law c=>1139
The determination of whether an encounter with law enforcement officers constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
is a legal conclusion that the Supreme Court
reviews for correctness. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
2. Arrest <3=>63.4(1), 63.5(4)
Criminal Law 0=1224(1)
Three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers and
citizens exist: (1) an officer may approach a
citizen at anytime and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer
has an "articulable suspicion" that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime;
however, the detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; and (3) an
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has

To determine whether evidence obtained
as a result of a violation of the Fourth
Amendment can be admitted at a defendant's
trial, the Court of Appeals examines whether
the evidence has been come at by exploitation of the illegality or by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint. U.S.CA Const.Amend. 4.
6. Criminal Law 0=394.1(3)
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception
to the exclusionary rule, and the appropriate
standard governing the inevitable discovery
exception is whether the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information ultimately would have
been discovered by lawful means; the state
must show that the evidence would have
been discovered, not simply that it could or
might have been discovered.
U.S.CA
ConstAmend. 4.
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7. Criminal Law <s=>1181(l)
£
It is not the function of an appellate
court to make findings of fact because it does
;s
not have the advantage of seeing or hearingg
the witnesses testify; moreover, complete, ac->
curate, and consistent findings of fact aree
essential to the resolution of a dispute undera*
the proper rule of law.

Linda M. Jones and Ralph Dellapiana, Saltit
Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Saltlt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges GREENWOOD,
JACKSON, and THORNE.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
111 Defendant Pearl Topanotes appealss
from her conviction for possession of a con-r
trolled substance, a third degree felony, inn
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1999). We reverse and re-u
mand.

BACKGROUND
H2 On October 7, 1998 three Salt Lakei
City police officers detained defendant on aa
public street and requested her identification.L
The officers retained defendant's identifica-tion, outside her presence, for approximatelyV
five minutes to check for outstanding warrants. The warrant check revealed at least
one outstanding warrant,1 so the officers arrested defendant.
The officers then1
searched defendant and found heroin. Defendant was ultimately charged with possession of a controlled substance.
113 Defendant moved to suppress the ad-mission of the heroin. The trial court denied1
the motion, and defendant entered a condi-tional guilty plea to one count of unlawful1
possession of a controlled substance; howev-er, she conditioned her plea on the right to)
1. The nature and amount of the outstanding warrants) was not disclosed in the record.

appeal from the trial court's denial of her
motion.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] 114 Defendant argues that the trial
court erred in denying her motion because
the police officers conducted a level-two stop
without the requisite articulable suspicion.
"[T]he determination of whether an encounter with law enforcement officers constitutes
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment . . .
is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness." Soft Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT
App 55,118, 998 P.2d 274.
ANALYSIS
[2] 115 Three levels of constitutionally
permissible encounters between police officers and citizens exist:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime: however, the "detention
must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop;" (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or
is being committed.
Id. (quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,
617-18 (Utah 1987)) (per curiam) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted).
16 We addressed a similar situation in
Ray.2 In that case, two police officers approached the defendant as she stood on a
walkway near a convenience store. See id. at
114. The officers asked for and then retained
the defendant's identification to check for
outstanding warrants, a process which took
about five minutes. See id. Before finally
determining the defendant's warrant status,
one of the officers asked to search her bags.
See id. The defendant consented to the
search, and the officer found drug paraphernalia. See id. at 116. The officers then ar2. The Utah Court of Appeals decided Ray on
March 2, 2000, about eight months after the trial
court decided this matter.
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rested her and charged her with possessing
drug paraphernalia. See id at 1M 6-7.

itable discovery is a valid exception to the
exclusionary rule, see State v. Northrup. 756
P.2d
1288, 1293 (Utah CtApp.1988). and
117 The defendant moved to suppress the
"[t]he
appropriate standard governing the
admission of the drug paraphernalia. See id
inevitable
discover}' exception is whether the
at H 7. Following a hearing on the motion, the
prosecution
can establish by a preponderance
trial court determined that the encounter did
of
the
evidence
that the information ultimatenot violate the defendant's Fourth Amendly
would
have
been discovered by lawful
ment rights and denied the motion. See id.
means.'"
State
v.
James, 2000 LT 80, « 16,
On appeal, we reversed the trial court, ex405
Utah
Adv.
Rep.
31 (quoting Nix v.
plaining that "[g]iven the totality of the cirWilliams,
467
U.S.
431,
444, 104 S.Ct. 2501,
cumstances, it is clear that a reasonable per81
L.Ed.2d
377
(1984)).
More precisely, the
son in [defendant's] position would not feel
State
"
'must
show
that
the
evidence 'would'
free to just walk away, thereby abandoning
have
been
discovered,
not
simply that it
her identification " See id at 1113 (emphasis
"could"
or
"might"
have
been
discovered.'"
added).
M.V v. State, 1999 UT App 104, 112, 977
[3] H 8 In the present matter, after exam- P.2d 494 (quoting Genovesi 909 P.2d at 923
ining the "totality of the circumstances" sur- n. 8) (alterations in original).
rounding the encounter between the officers
[7] H 11 Because the trial court ruled that
and defendant, we believe that "a reasonable
person in [defendant's] position would not the initial detention was legal, the issue of
feel free to just walk away, thereby abandon- inevitable discovery was not addressed being her identification." Id Accordingly, we low. "This court has consistently recognized
conclude that the detention was a level two that [issues of search and seizure] are highly
detention made without articulable suspicion fact sensitive," State v. Lovegren, 798 PJM
in violation of defendants Fourth Amend- 767, 770 (Utah CtApp.1990), and "[i]t is not
the function of an appellate court to make
ment rights.3
findings of fact because it does not have the
[4,5] 19 We must next address whether advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses
the evidence resulting from the violation can testify." Rucker v. Daltcm, 598 P.2d 1336,
be admitted at defendant's trial. Thus, we 1338 (Utah 1979). Moreover, "complete, acexamine " "whether ... the evidence has curatef,] and consistent findings of fact . . .
been come at by exploitation of [the] illegali- [are] essential to the resolution of dispute
ty or by means sufficiently distinguishable to under the proper rule of law." Id.
be purged of the primary taint.'" State v.
1112 Therefore, we remand for a factual
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288,1294 (Utah CtApp.
determination
on whether the heroin would
1988) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States,
have
been
inevitably
discovered and for such
371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed^d 441
proceedings
as
may
be
appropriate.
(1963)). Furthermore, we must "determine
whether the [search of Topanotes] fall[s]
1113 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T.
within the recognized limited exceptions to
GREENWOOD,
Presiding Judge and
the Fourth Amendment warrant requireNORMAN
H.
JACKSON,
Associate
ment." State v. Genovesi 909 P.2d 916, 919
Presiding
Judge.
(Utah CtApp.1995).
r

[6] U 10 The State argues that the officer's discovery of defendant's outstanding
warrants supports the application of the inevitable discovery exception to this case. Inev3u The State concedes, on appeal, in light of Ray,
- that by failing to immediately return defendant's
* identification card, the encounter escalated to a
i .'level-two detention. The State also concedes
that the police officers had no "articulable suspi-

cion" that defendant had "committed or was
about to commit a crime," ana therefore the
detention was a seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

ADDENDUM C

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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In the Third Judicial D i s t r i c t Court
U t a h sALTLAK^couarY
SALT LAKECOU* nr
In and For S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah
Deputy Clerk

Judgment, Sentence (commitment)
Case No. 981920853
Count No. 1
Honorable Leslie A Lewis
Clerk M Snarr
Video
9:55 am
Bailiff Angie Chichis
Date 7/28/99

The State of Utah
Plaintiff
V.S.

Pearl topanotes
Defendant

There being no legal or other reason why sentence should not be
imposed, and defendant having been convicted by a
a jury/
the
court, X plea of guilty;
plea of no contest; of the offense
of Possession of a herion, a controlled substance 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) ,
a felony of the 3rd degree,
Class a misdemeanor, being present
in court and ready for sentence and represented by
Ralph
Dellapina, and the State being represented by Mark Kouris , is now
adjudged guilty of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in
the Utah State Prison:
X
X

X

X

To an indeterminate term of 0-5 . years
And ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $. 1,000.00 Plus
an 85% surcharge
And ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 5
Such sentence is to run concurrently/consecutively with
Defendant is granted a stay of above (
Prison) sentence
and placed on probation in the custody of this Court
and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah
State Department of Adult Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County X for delivery to the Utah State Prison, Draper,
Utah, or
For delivery to the Salt Lake county Jail, where
defendant shall be confined and imprisoned lj^rf^eotdance with
this judgment and commitment
Commitment shall issue forthwith
Dated this

2flth

Day of

strict Court Judge Leslie Lewis
Page 1 of JL

Judge's Prison Term Recommendation
State of Utah vs Pearl Topanotes
Honorable L Lewis

CR

981920853

Pursuant to the provisions of 77-18-5, Utah code Annotated, 1953
as amended 1980, I recommend the following.

1. The defendant be given credit for time served of 55 davs
while in the Salt Lake County Jail.
2. The fine be cut in half once she has obtained her G.E.D.

Dated thTs^28th Day ^of July//''T)999

Judge Leslie A Lewis
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